June 1942

The Japanese sortied a fleet including four fleet carriers, two light carriers, their destroyer and cruiser screens and the ships to transport and support an occupation force of over 30,000 men. The Naval force was in the same order of size as the one that hit Pearl on December 7. They would bypass Midway, it would be easy to starve out after the fall of Pearl. Its supply line would be severed, it would become an orphan. This carrier fleet had one difference from the one that fought in December, two thirds of the pilots were new, many seasoned pilots were shot down over the American fleet and Pearl and the B-17 raid had taken an even greater toll than the air combat. The American pilots that faced them were relatively seasoned, most were veterans of the first battle. If there was a bright spot in the first battle, it was these pilots. The Americans however had no knowledge of this so when the fleet was spotted by a submarine, they considered it far more dangerous than it was.

The Pacific Fleet, or more correctly, what was left of it, was dispatched to meet the threat. As they approached Pearl, the fifteen American subs, aided by Catalinas and the B-17’s, some from the bypassed island of Midway turned the Japanese fleet. The air arm was responsible for sinking seventeen ships and it provided the information that kept the submarines in position to mount nearly continuous torpedo attacks. Never before had aircraft and submarines coordinated efforts to this extent. The Japanese fleet could never relax, tiring the men who should be able to protect it and reducing their efficiency. Only a few visionaries in the military had ever even considered the existence of a synergism of these two forces. None of these had even considered it might be a significant factor. By now Pearl had nearly 200 B-17’s, all had limited capacity to operate at night and because of their endurance the flights were timed to keep nearly continuous surveillance of the Japanese force. Several of the bombers from each flight carried a smaller bomb load and more fuel so they could remain in the area after they dropped their bombs to provide surveillance. They guided in the next flight and passed positions on to the Navy. They were given submarine frequencies and were instructed to give position, course and speed reports on the Submarine frequencies every fifteen minutes. These planes took some real assaults from the Zeros, staying in the area of a fully armed fleet carrier had risks, but the action was not all one sided. The Japanese fighter pilots acquired a healthy respect for the B-17 during this action. They learned the B-17’s that stayed in the fleet area to engage in surveillance could not be brushed away or shot down by fighters as easily as the Catalinas and the float planes. The B-17’s packed guns for protection as attacking fighters soon learned. In his action report one Japanese fighter pilot described the B-17. “This plane seems to be able to climb to heaven, fly forever, drop massive amounts of bombs, absorb machine gun bullets and cannon shells, keep flying after being damaged and shoot back effectively and continuously while doing it. If there is a weak spot in the plane’s defense, I have not been able to find it, but one thing I have learned, to come in from six o’clock is to court death. I am the only survivor of my squadron. Twice my wingman has been killed in a six o’clock attack.” That pilot was fished out of the water twice during the battle when tail gunners of B-17’s were able to disable his aircraft. He survived the air battles only to be killed in a bombing raid. Many of his squadron mates were not so fortunate. An ace with nine kills, a veteran of the first battle of Pearl, he was unable to score a single kill on a B-17.